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Self-Determination and Reconciliation: A




[We] are willing to let you have [the] lands, but [we] wish to
reserve the privilege of making sugar from the trees and get-
ting [our] living from the Lakes and Rivers, as [we] have done
heretofore .... It is hard to give up the lands. They will re-
main, and cannot be destroyed .... You know we cannot live
deprived of our lakes and rivers; there is some game on the
lands yet; and for that reason also we wish to remain upon
them, to get a living. The Great Spirit above, made the Earth,
and causes it to produce, which enables us to live.1
Aish-ke-bo-gi-ko-she (Flatmouth, Ojibwe Chief, Pillager
Band, speaking on behalf of the Chiefs at the July 29,
1837 Treaty with the Chippewa2 Conference).
Federal Native American policy has been markedly inconsis-
tent,3 but throughout, treaties have remained the nucleus of the
* B.S. University of Minnesota; J.D. University of Minnesota, 1992. For Lou-
ise Engler-Nyquist, and Evan and Emma.
1. Journal of Proceedings, Treaty of July 29, 1837 (from the notes of Ver-
planck Van Antwerp, Secretary of the Treaty Council) (cited in United States v.
Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (W.D. Wis. 1978)).
The Ojibwe did reserve hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in the Treaty
with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536.
2. This tribe is the Ojibwe, sometimes spelled Ojibwa or Qfibway. Treaties,
however, used the name Chippewa; consequently, treaty rights attach to the "Chip-
pewa." Ojibwe is used throughout the article except in treaty, book, or case names.
Native American is used with the same exceptions and the recognition that each
tribe is a distinct cultural and legal entity.
3. Native Americans have experienced several distinct and contradictory fed-
eral policy periods. 1) In the mid-1800s, tribes were moved to permanent reserva-
tions. 2) In the late 1800s, assimilation efforts were expressed in the General
Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 [hereinafter Allotment Act]
which allotted communal tribal lands to individual Native Americans. The Allot-
ment Act reduced Native American-held land from 138 million acres to 48 million
acres, half of which was arid or semi-arid. 3) In 1934, the Indian Reorganization
(Wheeler-Howard) Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988) acknowledged that tribes should ex-
ist indefinitely, protected the remaining tribal land, and encouraged tribal self-gov-
ernment. 4) In the late 1940s and early 1950s, during termination and relocation of
tribes, the United States terminated its relationship with 109 tribes and extended
state jurisdiction into tribal territory. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
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federal government's legal relationship with Native Americans.4
Treaties also functioned as peace-keeping devices between Native
Americans and settlers.5 Initially, tribal sovereignty and military
power allowed Native Americans to negotiate early treaties from a
position of strength. However, tribal bargaining power weakened
throughout the 1800s, due in part to an increased federal military
presence. As a result, the federal government negotiated treaties
against a backdrop of diminishing tribal power.6 Consequently,
later treaties encroached upon tribal autonomy.7 Although trea-
ties transferred over two billion acres of Native American land to
the United States,8 Native Americans of the Great Lakes Region
and the Northwest reserved9 fishing, hunting, and gathering rights
on some of this ceded land.
Part I of this article discusses the importance of reserved
fishing rights to the Ojibwe and the controversy surrounding the
recognition and exercise of Ojibwe treaty rights. Part I also notes
the emergence of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in negotiat-
ing treaty rights disputes nationwide and in Minnesota. Part II
discusses the general rationale underlying ADR and finds that
power imbalances are an unexamined but critical weakness of
ADR. Treaty rights agreements are flawed because expansion of
state interests into tribal territory has diminished tribal self-deter-
mination and has effected a power imbalance between the negoti-
ating parties. Moreover, Minnesota's benevolence cannot
substitute for self-determination in negotiations; without self-de-
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 and Supp.
III) [hereinafter Public Law 280]. 5) In the 1960s, federal policy returned to tribal
self-determination. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988)
amended Public Law 280, allowing retrocession of Public Law 280 jurisdiction and
requiring tribal consent for further assertions of state jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-22, 1326. Presidents Nixon and Reagan repudiated termination and stressed
tribal autonomy.
For an expanded discussion, see Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 47-206 (R. Strickland ed. 1982) [hereinafter Handbook of Federal Indian Law]
and William C. Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 9-31 (2d ed. 1988) [here-
inafter American Indian Law].
4. The President makes treaties; the Senate ratifies treaties with a two-thirds
vote. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Under the Supremacy Clause, treaties preempt
conflicting state laws. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
5. William C. Canby, The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62
Wash. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1987).
6. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note 3, at 69.
7. Id. at 47-48.
8. Id, at 48.
9. Treaty fishing rights are "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but ... a res-
ervation of [rights] not granted." United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
For a discussion of the origin of treaty rights, see Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
supra note 3, at 441-46.
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termination, benevolence becomes paternalism. Part III concludes
that even if Minnesota will not recognize Qjibwe treaty rights, the
Mille Lacs Band is likely to establish treaty rights through litiga-
tion. Part IV urges cooperation and reconciliation and presents a
mutually beneficial cooperative model wherein Minnesota would
accept the Ojibwe Bands' treaty rights and the Ojibwe Bands
would accept Minnesota Department of Natural Resources exper-
tise in managing resources on ceded land. The proposed model
will cooperatively resolve resource management conflicts on ceded
land and could develop into an evolved model for resolving future
tribal-state conflicts. Such a cooperative venture will succeed be-
cause it is future-oriented, adds clarity to the Minnesota-Ojibwe
treaty relationship, encourages non-acrimonious conflict manage-
ment, and practices reciprocity. Part V suggests the cooperative
venture will foster reliable behavior, erode racism and status hier-
archy,'0 and lessen political unrest.
Part I
A. Fishing Rights:" Significance and Controversy
Fishing rights have enormous cultural and economic signifi-
cance to Native Americans. The Supreme Court recognized the
importance of fish to the Northwestern tribes as "not much less
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they
breathed."' 2 The Court has held that these important treaty fish-
ing rights aren't easily abrogated,' 3 include the right to fish com-
mercially,14 and, if taken, are compensable.15
In the Great Lakes region, fish and fishing are integral to the
Ojibwe totemic system, religion, and diet; fishing also influenced
the geographical selection of Qjibwe reservations. The Ojibwe
10. The author defines status hierarchy as the rigid, socioeconomic stratification
of identifiable groups. The status hierarchy reduces interaction among groups,
which fosters alienation and maintains the status quo. See infra notes 202-206 and
accompanying text.
11. This article initially discusses treaty rights within the context of fishing
rights because public attention and litigation focuses on fishing rights. This does
not diminish the importance of the rights to hunt game, gather wild rice, and
collect maple sap. Later references to treaty rights include these rights.
12. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
13. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968). Hunting and
fishing rights survived the termination of federal-tribal relations. See id.
14. Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973); Lac Courte Oreilles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1435
(W.D. Wis. 1987).
15. Menominee, 391 U.S. at 413.
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were known in their native tongue as "Great Lake Men."'1 Ac-
cording to Ojibwe oral history, the ancient totemic system is the
first division of Ojibwe kindred, and this totemic system stems
from six beings who emerged from "the great water."17 The first
being to emerge was the head of the clan representing all six fish
totems.18 Ojibwe Bands procured food by fishing19 and also traded
fish with early settlers.20 The Ojibwe settled near lakes and riv-
ers21 and all Minnesota reservation sites were selected from lands
that encompass or border lakes or rivers. Thus, the Ojibwe culture
is intrinsically linked to water rights and fishing.
Although treaty rights are held in definite geographic bound-
aries based on aboriginal title,22 reserved treaty rights are on lands
ceded to the United States and are not part of Indian Country.23
Consequently, state, tribal, and private interests are at stake in the
16. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm'n, A Guide to Understanding
Chippewa Treaty Rights 13 (1989) [hereinafter Chippewa Treaty Rights].
17. William W. Warren, The History of the Ojibway People 43-44 (1984) (origi-
nally published as: History of the Ojibways in 1885, based upon traditions and oral
statements (Collections of the Minnesota Historical Society, v. 5)).
18. Aw-aus-e, the first being to emerge from the great water, heads the Aw-aus-
e Clan. The fish totems of the Aw-aus-e clan are: Man-um-aig (Catfish); Kenovshay
(Pike); Numa-hin (Sucker); Numa (Sturgeon); Ude-Kumaig (Whitefish); and Ne-
baun-aub-ay (Mermen). The Aw-aus-e Clan also claims the Me-she-num-aig-way
(analogous to the Biblical Leviathan), a spirit in the sacred Me-da-we rite. Id.
19. Id. at 40; see also Harold Hickerson, Ethnohistory of Chippewa of Lake Su-
perior, in Chippewa Indians III 146 (David Agee Horr ed. 1974) [hereinafter Lake
Superior Chippewa]; Harold Hickerson, Ethnohistory of Chippewa in Central Min-
nesota, in Chippewa Indians 11202 (David Agee Horr ed. 1974) [hereinafter Central
Minnesota Chippewa]; Harold Hickerson, Ethnohistory of Mississippi Bands and
Pillager and Winnibigoshish Bands of Chippewa, in Chippewa Indians IV 247
(David Agee Horr ed. 1974) [hereinafter Mississippi Chippewa] (all three volumes
are from the Garland American Indian Ethnohistory Series).
20. Lake Superior Chippewa, supra note 19, at 40, 123, 126; Central Minnesota
Chippewa, supra note 19, at 76; Mississippi Chippewa, supra note 19, at 88.
21. In the 1800s, the Ojibwe settled near their fisheries. Lake Superior Chip-
pewa, supra note 19, at 144; Central Minnesota Chippewa, supra note 19, at 203;
Mississippi Chippewa, supra note 19, at 293. Rivers and lakes also provided wild
rice beds, a gathering site for game, and transportation routes.
22. Aboriginal title is based on use and occupancy. Handbook of Federal Indian
Law, supra note 3, at 442-43.
23. Indian Country is defined by statute as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the juris-
diction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reser-
vation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and, (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). Thus, Indian Country covers more territory than reserva-
tion lands created by treaty or statute; it includes off-reservation Native American
communities.
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treaty rights controversy.24 Private interest groups of sportsmen,
resort owners, and equal rights advocates have organized either to
oppose or support treaty rights.2 5 Although private interest groups
continue to oppose treaty rights on constitutional26 and other
grounds, courts have consistently upheld treaty rights.27 Since
courts have also determined that treaty rights are held in common
with state citizens,28 who will manage the commonly held re-
sources becomes an issue. These resource management issues29
24. Groups opposing treaty fishing rights express concern over the clouding of
property titles, resource depletion, and constitutional equal protection problems.
See infra notes 26, 29.
25. Groups opposing treaty rights are primarily located in northern border
states, although Nebraska and New Mexico also have local groups. Citizens Equal
Rights Alliance (CERA), a national umbrella organization, has a 22 state member-
ship. CERA's purpose is to "change ... Federal Indian Policies and laws [to] . ..
assure equal rights for all citizens .... Citizens Equal Rights Alliance, Member-
ship Brochure and Purpose Statement. In Minnesota, the White Earth Equal
Rights Committee and Totally Equal Americans contest treaty rights; in Wisconsin,
the groups opposing treaty rights include Protect Americans Rights and Resources
(PARR) and Stop Treaty Abuse, Inc. (STA). STA marketed "Treaty Beer," prom-
ising the proceeds to candidates favoring treaty abrogation.
Citizens groups supporting treaty rights in Wisconsin include Witness for Non-
Violence and Traditional Rights; Wisconsin Greens; and HONOR. Chippewa
Treaty Rights, supra note 16, at 14-16.
26. Because the United States made Native Americans citizens in 1924, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b)(1989), state citizens argue they are denied equal protection as similarly
situated citizens. The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the equal protection
argument in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 680-83 (1979).
27. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
28. Under the Pacific Northwest treaties, fishing rights are held in common
with state citizens. Treaty with the Nisquallys, Puyallups, Steilacooms, Squaksins,
S'Homamish, Steh-chas, T'Peeksins, Squi-aitls and Sa-heh-wamish, Dec. 26, 1854,
art. 3, 10 Stat. 1133. Unlike the Northwest treaties, the treaties with the Ojibwe do
not state that treaty rights are to be held in common with state citizens. See, e.g.,
Treaty with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, art. 5, 7 Stat. 536; Treaty with the Chip-
pewa, September 30, 1854, art. 11, 10 Stat. 1109. However, a Wisconsin federal dis-
trict court ruled that the Ojibwe do hold treaty rights in common with state
citizens. United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1338 (W.D. Wis. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (1987).
29. Actually, treaty game harvests are small. For example, the Great Lakes In-
dian Fish and Wildlife Commission reports the 1989 Wisconsin tribal off-reservation
walleye harvest at 16,053 fish; the 1989 estimated sports walleye harvest was
839,000. The 1988 Minnesota tribal deer harvest under a 1988 Treaty Agreement,
see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text, was 147 deer; the sports harvest was
31,053. Chippewa Treaty Rights, supra note 16, at 5.
Nevertheless, fishing and hunting enthusiasts fear a "tragedy of the commons"
which arises when a commonly held resource is unregulated. The costs of depleting
the resource are ignored by the resource consumer because there is no incentive to
conserve, but there is an incentive to quickly and efficiently exploit the resource
before others do so. Private property concepts internalize detrimental over-con-
sumption. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science
1243 (1968); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ.
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have spurred protests at fishing sites in Wisconsin; the protests ex-
posed tribal members to physical and verbal abuse and blatant ra-
cism. 3 0 These resource management issues require extensive
litigation even after treaty rights are established, in order to define
the scope of the treaty rights.3 1
Rev. 347 (1967). But see Annette Baler, Trust and Anti-Trust, 96 Ethics 231, 243
(1986). Baier asserts that holding "common goods" is "the best reason for confi-
dence in another's good care of what one cares about." Id.
30. Tribe members were subjected to such abuse that Judge Crabb wrote,
"fhlarrassment has become a fact of life for [tribal members]." Lac Courte Oreilles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 707 F. Supp. 1034, 1054 (W.D. Wis.
1989). Racist insults at landing sites are shocking, and include: "Save two walleye,
spear a pregnant squaw." Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Indians v. Stop
Treaty Rights Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., No. 81-C-117-C, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Wis. Mar.
15, 1991). Posters in bars in Northern Wisconsin degrade and threaten the Qjibwe.
One poster advertised, "[hlelp wanted: Small Indians for mud flaps. Must be will-
ing to travel." Id. Another poster appeared prior to the 1987 spearing season de-
picting a close up of a large revolver pointed directly outward with the slogan in
large letters-"SPEAR... THIS!!!" Chippewa Treaty Rights, supra note 16, at 15.
As a result of stone throwings, threats, racial and sexual slurs, minor batteries,
damage to Ojibwe vehicles, and the creation of life-threatening water turbulence
where the Ojibwe fished, Judge Crabb issued an injunction barring any interfer-
ence with tribal members exercising fishing rights. Lac du Flambeau, No. 81-C-117-
C, slip op. at 4, 15-16.
31. Major treaty fishing rights litigation in Washington began as early as 1905 in
Winans and has been quieted by negotiation strategies. In Wisconsin, major litiga-
tion began as early as 1968 in Menominee and continues today. In 1983, the Sev-
enth Circuit established treaty rights in Wisconsin under the 1837 and 1842 Treaties
with the Chippewa. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Besadny v. Lac Courte Oreil-
les Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 464 U.S. 805 (1983). However, 13 fur-
ther court decisions were needed to resolve procedural questions, define the scope
of the treaty rights, and the scope of state regulation. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 595 F. Supp. 1077 (W.D. Wis. 1984);
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 760
F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indi-
ans v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420 (W.D. Wis. 1987); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 663 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wis. 1987);
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 116
F.R.D. 608 (W.D. Wis. 1987); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987); Lac Courte Oreilles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 829 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1987); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 686 F. Supp.
226 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
v. Wisconsin, 707 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D. Wis. 1989); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 740 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 749 F. Supp.
913 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
v. Wisconsin, No. 74-C-313C (W.D. Wis. 1991); Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Supe-
rior Indians v. Stop Treaty Rights Abuse-Wis., Inc., No. 81-C-117-C (W.D. Wis.
1991) (granting an injunction preventing interference with tribal members exercis-
ing treaty fishing rights).
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B. Negotiating the Exercise of Treaty Rights
Tribes and states seek alternatives to this costly and divisive
litigation. The Executive Director of the Native American Rights
Fund envisions a decreased need for litigation and an increased
need for alternative dispute resolution as citizens are familiarized
with established treaty rights.32 Currently, negotiated agreements
are resolving Native American water rights conflicts in the west-
ern United States.33 In addition to negotiating agreements that re-
solve present day rights disputes, Native Americans serve on a
policy board in Washington state that advised state policymakers
on regulatory matters.34
The state of Minnesota and Ojibwe Bands holding reserved
treaty rights have used negotiated agreements innovatively in
treaty rights disputes.35 Minnesota's 1973 agreement [hereinafter
1973 Agreement] with the Leech Lake Reservation spurred con-
gressional consideration of the Tribal-State Compact Act of 1978.36
Minnesota's settlement of treaty rights in 1988 [hereinafter 1988
Agreement] under the 1854 Treaty with the Chippewa 37 was the
first successful tribal-state agreement to resolve a hunting and
32. John E. Echohawk, Negotiation: Crucial to Healing, 8 Consensus 2 (1990).
Consensus devoted its October 1990 issue to Alternative Dispute Resolution, "A
New Kind of Justice for Native Americans." Consensus, published by The Public
Disputes Network, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, "spotlight[s]
cases of successful dispute settlement .... to encourage the use of [alternative dis-
pute resolution] techniques .... Id.
33. See John Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve
Water Disputes Involving Indian Rights, 28 Nat. Resources J. 63 (1988). (Folk-Wil-
liams summarizes key problems and offers process suggestions for those negotiating
resolutions to Native American water rights cases.)
34. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
35. In 1973, following the filing of Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Herbst, No. 3-69 Civ. 65 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 25, 1972), Minnesota and the Leech
Lake Band negotiated an on-reservation agreement that developed and jointly en-
forced a tribal conservation code. See Consent Judgment at 7-8, 15-16, Leech Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians, No. 3-69 Civ. 65 (D. Minn. June 18, 1973). After the fil-
ing of Grand Portage Band of Chippewas of Lake Superior v. Minnesota, Civ. No 4-
85-1090 (D. Minn. filed Aug. 20, 1985), Minnesota and three Ojibwe Bands negoti-
ated a similar agreement covering off-reservation land ceded under the 1854 Treaty
with the Chippewa. The ceded land roughly comprises the arrowhead region of
northeastern Minnesota bordering Lake Superior. Memorandum of Agreement,
Grand Portage Band of Chippewa of Lake Superior v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-85-1090
(D. Minn. filed Feb. 2, 1988).
36. The Tribal-State Compact Act was not enacted. The Act encouraged juris-
diction and regulatory agreements between states and tribes, subject to Department
of Interior approval and provided that the agreements were mutually voidable. See
Federal Indian Law, supra note 3, at 381 n.8, 11. See also Rachal San Kronowitz,
Joanne Lichtman, Steven Paul McSloy & Matthew G. Olsen, Toward Consent and
Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 507, 584-86 (1987).
37. Treaty with the Chippewa, Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109.
Law and Inequality
fishing treaty rights dispute on ceded land without protracted liti-
gation.3 8 Minnesota negotiated the 1988 Agreement to "avoid the
racial tensions, enmities, and deleterious economic impacts when
Indian people have substantially greater rights to harvest fish and
game than do their non-Indian neighbors."3 9 The 1988 Agreement
pays the Fond du Lac, Grand Portage, and Bois Forte Bands to for-
bear the exercise of hunting, fishing, and gathering treaty rights
and requires the Bands to write a tribal conservation code with
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) approval.40
On July 1, 1989, six days after the federal court approved the
agreement, the Fond du Lac Band exercised a one-year option to
leave the agreement. At this time, Minnesota does not formally
recognize Ojibwe treaty rights,41 yet some Bands are paid to for-
bear exercising treaty rights under the 1988 Agreement. Further,
the forbearing Bands' conservation code extends, with MDNR ap-
proval, game harvest beyond MDNR regulations. Minnesota's
treaty rights situation creates a dilemma; Minnesota does not ac-
cept treaty rights, yet recognizes them de facto.
To compound the dilemma, Minnesota now faces treaty rights
litigation under a new treaty with another Band. In August 1990,
the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe filed suit,42 asserting treaty rights
established by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 43 in Wisconsin
under the 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa4 4 [hereinafter 1837
Treaty]. Minnesota claims the Mille Lacs Band's 1837 Treaty
rights were expressly terminated by the Treaty of February 22,
38. Minnesota Attorney General's Office, 1854 Treaty Settlement Briefing Pa-
per (September 9, 1988, revised May 3, 1990) [hereinafter Treaty Briefing Paper].
39. Id.
40. Grand Portage Band of Chippewas of Lake Superior v. Minnesota, Civ. No.
4-85-1090, slip op. at 4 (D. Minn. June 8, 1988) (Memorandum and Order). Because
the MDNR approves the Band's code, it is not surprising that the Band's conserva-
tion code varies only slightly from MDNR regulations in terms of method of har-
vest, length of season, and game harvest limits.
41. "[Minnesota] does not waive any defenses or arguments it may have with
regard to legal rights under the 1854 Treaty .... The... Bands agree to forbear the
exercise of certain rights that they claim are reserved by the 1854 Treaty .... "
Memorandum of Agreement at 6-7, Grand Portage Band of Chippewas of Lake Su-
perior v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-85-1090 (D. Minn. June 8, 1988) (emphasis added).
42. The Mille Lacs Band claims the following damages: "confiscation of per-
sonal property; fines and other monetary penalties; incarceration; and the imposi-
tion of state licence fees" resulting from arrests of Band members exercising treaty
rights. Complaint, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, (Civ. No. 4-
90-605) (D. Minn. filed August, 1990).
43. Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). The 1837
Treaty covers a large area in northwestern Wisconsin and extends into central Min-
nesota approximately fifty miles. For a detailed map, see United States v.
Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1362-63 (W.D. Wis. 1978).
44. Treaty with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536.
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1855, between the United States and the Mississippi Bands of the
Chippewa45 [hereinafter 1855 Treaty]. Alternatively, Minnesota
claims President Zachary Taylor's 1850 removal order extin-
guished the Mille Lacs Band's 1837 Treaty rights.46 Minnesota also
alleges that the Seventh Circuit's recognition of treaty rights
under the 1837 Treaty has no value as precedent in Minnesota.47
Although the Mille Lacs Band considers the 1988 Agreement inad-
equate, 48 a negotiated agreement similar to the 1988 Agreement
could settle the Mille Lacs Band's 1837 Treaty rights claim.
Minnesota has three choices: continue the treaty rights di-
lemma by purchasing forbearance of treaty rights it does not rec-
ognize; pursue costly and divisive litigation; or escape the treaty
rights dilemma by accepting Ojibwe treaty rights and negotiating
resource management or forbearance agreements with the Ojibwe
on a more equal basis.
Part II
A. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): The Problem of
Unequal Negotiating Strength and the Need for
Self-Determination
ADR has grown in reaction to an apparent litigation explo-
sion 49 that imposes costs on both the tax-supported judicial system
and the individual parties.50 Moreover, litigation stresses litigants
psychologically and burdens judicial administration.5 1 Congested
dockets and the 1983 revision of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure encourage judges to settle cases.5 2 However, en-
45. Answer at 3-5, Mille Lacs Band (Civ. No. 4-90-605); see also Treaty with the
Chippewa, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165.
46. Answer at 3-5, Mille Lacs Band (Civ. No. 4-90-605).
47. Id.
48. Telephone interview with Anita Fineday, co-counsel for the Mille Lacs
Band (November 20, 1990).
49. For contrasting views on the nature and extent of the litigation explosion
see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscapes of Disputes.- What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Soci-
ety, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983) (questioning the extent of the burden of increased
lawsuit filings) and Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 76-77
(1985) (noting the increase in federal caseload growth without a sociological expla-
nation like Prohibition litigation in the 1920s and 1930s).
50. But see David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L. F. Felstiner, Herbert M.
Kritzer & Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev.
72, 123 (1983) (an empirical study suggesting most ordinary litigation is cost effec-
tive for litigants).
51. But see id. (even though the study was "unable [to] fully.., assess the costs
... of litigation from a social point of view .... [the authors] doubt whether the
system is in crisis").
52. Rule 16 governs pretrial conferences. After an empirical study found judi-
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couraging judicial involvement in settlement may compromise ju-
dicial ability to adjudicate fairly.53 Beyond the obvious economic,
social, and jurisprudential concerns lies the fundamental question:
can ADR produce equitable results?54
Institutionalizing and routinizing settlement wrongly assumes
equal power between the parties.55 A power imbalance between
negotiating parties outside of the adjudicative process, although
critical, is largely ignored in negotiation analysis.56 Instead, negoti-
ation analysis traditionally focuses on quality of participation.5 7
However, before considering the quality of participation, parties
must be equally empowered through autonomy and self-determi-
nation. 6 Like many negotiated agreements, a negotiated agree-
ment between the Mille Lacs Band and the State of Minnesota
wrongly assumes equal power and self-determination between the
parties. Presently, Minnesota has negotiating leverage over the
Ojibwe by virtue of its superior economic resources and its increas-
ing influence in Indian Country. This power imbalance suggests
that any negotiated settlement between the Mille Lacs Band and
Minnesota may be unfair and could reinforce social inequities.59
cial control of litigation helped resolve litigation with speed and economy, Rule 16
was rewritten in 1983, expressly adding settlement discussion to pretrial confer-
ences in Rule 16(a)(5) and 16(c)(7). Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note.
53. Judith Resnick, Failing Faith. Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 494, 548 (1986); see also Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 376, 380 (1983).
54. See generally Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in
The Politics of Informal Justice 267 (Richard L. Abel ed. 1982) (examining in-
formalism's repressive and liberating aspects).
55. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
56. Id. (disputes may not be between equals, but between a large corporation
and a worker, or between a city and a racial minority); Frederick R. Anderson, Ne-
gotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 Duke L.J. 261,
326 n.240 (discussing the problem of self-determination and relative power and in-
fluence during negotiations); see also Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State,
and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. Rev.
999, 1001 (1988) (dependent people must be empowered before participation in ne-
gotiations); Baier, supra note 29, at 240-41 (discussing the "myopia" of assumed
equality of power in trust relationships).
57. Handler, supra note 56, at 1001.
58. Id. (stressing the need for autonomy); see also Anderson, supra note 56, at
326 n.240 (quoting Cormick, Intervention and Self-Determination in Environmen-
tal Disputes: A Mediator's Perspective, Resolve, Winter 1982, at 2 (Cormick dis-
cusses the need for self-determination through independent power to negotiate
effectively)).
59. "Delegalization and informalism can, under current social conditions, rein-
force rather then erode asymmetric power relations." Gunther Teubner, 17 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 239, 241 (1983) (citing Richard L. Abel, Delegalization: A Critical Review
of Its Ideology, Manifestations and Social Consequences, Alternative Rechtsformen
and Alternativen zum Recht (1980)).
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B. Power Imbalance Between the Mille Lacs Band and the
State of Minnesota Is Manifested in Unequal
Monetary Resources and the Erosion of
Tribal Se~f-Determination
A power imbalance can be tangible, such as a disparity in re-
sources. Resource disparity will influence a settlement between
the Mille Lacs Band and Minnesota in three ways.6 0 First, the
Mille Lacs Band has fewer pre-litigation resources with which to
gather and analyze the information necessary to predict the out-
come.61 Second, the Mille Lacs Band's immediate economic
needs62 may force the Band to accept a less favorable settlement.
Third, the Mille Lacs Band has fewer resources to finance the ac-
tual litigation. The State of Minnesota's resource advantage neces-
sarily influences any settlement between the Mille Lacs Band and
Minnesota.
Less tangible, but more critical, is the essential need for the
self-determination of all parties in any fairly negotiated dispute
resolution.63 Tribal self-determination or sovereignty was the pri-
mary source of tribal power in the original treaty negotiations.6 4
However, over the past thirty years, and despite a federal policy of
tribal autonomy, tribal self-determination has diminished with the
expansion of state influence in Indian Country through recent
Supreme Court decisions65 and the continuation of Public Law 280
jurisdiction over Indian Country.
The Supreme Court has weakened tribal negotiating strength
and self-determination by expanding state influence in Indian
60. See Fiss, supra note 55, at 1076-78.
61. A treaty rights dispute requires considerable resources to research national
and local archives in preparation for litigation.
62. The Mille Lacs Band claims the annual per capita income of Mille Lacs Res-
ervation is $2100 and unemployment reaches fifty percent. Complaint at 7, Mille
Lacs Band (Civ. No. 4-90-605).
63. Anderson, supra note 56, at 326 n.240.
64. American Indian Law, supra note 3, at 84-85.
65. See Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2280, 2297-98 (1989). The Supreme Court and Congress have
collaborated;
Congress has worked its will upon the tribes in whatever way it has
wished, even when its actions have wholly lacked a constitutional basis
or have obviously violated treaties .... [Tihe Supreme Court has
never held an act of Congress against the tribes to be unconstitutional
.... However, now that Congress has, at least temporarily, laid down
the role of aggressor against the tribes, the Supreme Court has taken
it up.
Id; see also Canby, supra note 5, at 22 (Supreme Court's recent posture is at odds
with congressional and executive policy of self-determination.).
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Country.66 The Court's position on allowing state influence in In-
dian Country has incrementally shifted over the past 150 years.
Initially, the Court rejected state influence in Indian Country. Re-
cently, the Court has applied a test allowing tribal and federal in-
terests to preempt state interests only with "complete abdication
or non-involvement . . . in on-reservation activit[ies]" by the
state.6 7 The Court has virtually created federal-state-tribal tripar-
tite rule over Indian Country, weakening tribal self-determination,
the essential element in a legitimately negotiated agreement.68
Consequently, tribal negotiating strength is weakened vis-a-vis the
state.
In 1832, the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia stated
that state laws had "no force" in Cherokee territory.69 Tribal sov-
ereignty and self-determination remained relatively strong70 until
1959, when the Supreme Court formally recognized state interests
in Indian Country with the introduction of the "infringement test"
in Williams v. Lee. 71 Although the infringement test is viewed as
a reaffirmation of tribal authority,72 it also can diminish tribal self-
determination by allowing state influence in Indian Country if the
court determines that state action does not "infringe" on tribal au-
thority to govern.73
66. This discussion is necessarily general, using seminal cases to demonstrate
the erosion of tribal self-determination and expansion of state influence in Indian
Country. The complexity and intricacy of federal Native American law can be be-
dazzling. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal In-
dian Law, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1199 (1989) (examining the reasons underlying the
incoherence in federal Native American law).
67. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698, 1712 (1989).
68. See Anderson, supra note 56, at 326 n.240.
69. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
70. But see, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (affirming Col-
orado's criminal jurisdiction over a non-Native American defendant for the murder
of a non-Native American on the reservation.); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S.
240 (1896) (applying the same rule in Montana).
71. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) A state could not assert jurisdiction over a debt ac-
tion arising on the reservation brought by a non-Native American against a Native
American. Id. [Tihe Court stated, "the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them." Id.
72. See Steven M. Christenson, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Haz-
ardous Waste in Indian Country, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1091, 1097 (1987); see also Ste-
phen M. Feldman, The Developing Test for State Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian
Country: Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 Or. L. Rev. 561, 567
(1982).
73. See Canby, supra note 5, at 6. The infringement test is potentially "not very
protective of tribal authority if the area of tribal self-government [is] narrowly
viewed." Id. Tribal authority was limited in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 564-65 (1981) (certain tribal powers are "inconsistent with the dependent status
of the tribes") and in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(power to arrest and try a non-Native American for violations of tribal law on-res-
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In 1973, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n 7 4 the
Court relegated tribal sovereignty to a mere "backdrop" to aid in
treaty and statute interpretation.75 The Court adopted "federal
preemption" of state interests as the dominant test for resolving
tribal-state conflicts without expressly replacing the infringement
test.76 McC7anahan assumes that state law will apply if not pre-
empted by federal law. 77 The McClanahan decision reversed the
Williams' presumption of no state infringement7S and ran con-
trary to the federal policy of tribal self-determination. 79 By con-
sidering state interests8 o and failing to clarify the scope of the
preemption analysis under the infringement test, the Court takes
an ad hoc approach, encouraging lower courts to construe federal
statutes narrowly or broadly in order to achieve a desired result.s1
In 1989, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,8 2 the
Court's ad hoc approach resulted in a holding that the state's con-
current taxation of a non-Native American oil corporation's on-
reservation activity survived the preemption analysis. Although
claiming to apply a "flexible pre-emption analysis sensitive to the
particular state, federal, and tribal interests,"8 3 the Court actually
applied an "exclusivity" standard,8 4 suggesting preemption of state
interests only with "complete abdication or non-involvement of
the state in on-reservation activity."8 5
Cotton Petroleum's preemption analysis gives state interests
extraordinary deference while minimizing tribal and federal inter-
ests. First, the Court acknowledged that tribal and federal regula-
ervation is inconsistent with the dependent nation status of tribes). See also San
Kronowitz, Lichtman, McSloy & Olsen, supra note 36, at 569 (Williams is an "ero-
sion of the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty as an independent bulwark
against state interference.").
74. 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Arizona attempted to levy tax on income earned by Na-
tive Americans entirely upon the reservation.).
75. Id. at 172.
76. Christenson, supra note 72, at 1100; San Kronowitz, Lichtman, McSloy &
Olsen, supra note 36, at 564. But see Feldman, supra note 72, at 569 (claiming Mc-
Clanahan revitalizes the Williams infringement test).
77. San Kronowitz, Lichtman, McSloy & Olsen, supra note 36, at 564.
78. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171. "[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been
adjusted to take account of the State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs
of non-Indians." Id. See Canby, supra note 5, at 7.
79. Canby, supra note 5, at 22.
80. Id.
81. San Kronowitz, Lichtman, McSloy & Olsen, supra note 36, at 565. See also
Canby, supra note 5, at 7. Preemption analysis is "extremely fact-specific .... As a
consequence, results are unpredictable." Id.
82. 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
83. Id at 1711.
84. Id. at 1723 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Id at 1712.
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tory interests were "extensive"8s but held that the state's minor
regulatory interest8 7 was not preempted because tribal and federal
interests were not "exclusive."8 8 Second, the court magnified state
interests, weighing relatively insignificant state oil-and-gas-related
expenditures on the reservation too heavily.8 9 Third, the Court
further diminished tribal interests by ignoring the tribe's reliance
on gas and oil leases for ninety percent of tribal income.90 Accord-
ing to the Court, the additional state taxes, resulting in a seventy-
five percent tax increase to lease purchasers, had only "a marginal
effect on the . .. [value of] on-reservation leases .... [An effect]
too indirect and too insubstantial" to impair the federal and tribal
policy of securing the highest value for the exploitation of reserva-
tion resources.9 1 The Court's characterization of Cotton Petro-
leum's application of the preemption test as flexible and sensitive
to trib-l interests seems disingenuous; under this formulation,
state interests dominate federal and tribal interests.
The Court's discussion of Cotton Petroleum Corporation's al-
ternative claims of multiple taxation and commerce clause viola-
tions was more candid. In rejecting Cotton Petroleum
Corporation's multiple taxation claim, the Court relegated the
tribe to merely one of "three different governmental entities, each
of which has taxing jurisdiction" on the reservation.92 Any burden
from the additional state tax was "entirely attributable to the fact
that . . . two governmental entities share jurisdiction."93 The
Court applied the same analysis to reject Cotton Petroleum Corpo-
ration's commerce clause claim, concluding that the "[s]tates and
tribes have concurrent jurisdiction" and therefore, the commerce
86. Id.
87. Id at 1723 n.9. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) Even the state regulation of the
mechanical integrity and spacing of the wells demonstrates the pervasiveness of
federal interests; the state regulation could not apply without federal Bureau of
Land Management approval. Id.
88. Id. at 1712.
89. The Cotton Petroleum dissent notes that, during the five years at issue,
"federal expenditures were $1,206,800; tribal expenditures were $736,358; the state
spent, at most, $89,384. Id. at 1724 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for
Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae at 10-11 n.8). The state collected
$2,293,953 in taxes for their $89,384 expenditure. Id. at 1724 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id. at 1725 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. Id at 1713. The Court contradicted its previous rejection of Arizona's two
percent gross proceeds tax on a non-Native American trader on the reservation be-
cause it put "financial burdens on [either the trader] or the Indians .... Id. at
1726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Conm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965)).
92. Id. at 1714.
93. Id.
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clause did not apply.94 Even if the Court did not make Indian
Country a state-federal-tribal tripartite in Cotton Petroleum, ap-
parently any state interest will survive Cotton Petroleum's pre-
emption analysis.
Although recently Congress has not expanded state interests
in Indian Country, in 1953 Public Law 280 gave Minnesota and
four other states jurisdiction over Indian Country.95 As a result of
both state and tribal criticism,96 the Indian Civil Rights Act al-
lowed states to retrocede Public Law 280 jurisdiction to the federal
government.97 Although Public Law 280 jurisdiction is limited,98
Minnesota has not retroceded jurisdiction and retains some legal
authority over the Mille Lacs Band. Public Law 280 jurisdiction
and the Supreme Court's affirmation of expanded state interests in
Indian Country limit the Mille Lacs Band's self-determination and
thus, the Band's effectiveness in negotiating agreements with
Minnesota.
C. Benevolence or Trust Cannot Substitute for Self-
Determination
The Mille Lacs Band needs self-determination in treaty
rights negotiations to ensure equitable settlement of their treaty
rights. Even if Minnesota attempts to negotiate benevolently, that
is, in the interests of the Mille Lacs Band, the agreement would.
still be suspect. Benevolence and paternalism weaken the Mille
Lacs Band's autonomy and negotiating strength.99 The judicially
94. Id. at 1716.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988)(for criminal offenses); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988) (for
civil jurisdiction). California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin were
granted jurisdiction; Alaska was added in 1958. Public Law 280 allowed other states
the option to assert jurisdiction. Ten other states assumed differing levels of juris-
diction over Indian Country. See Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note 3, at
362-63 n.122, 123, 125.
96. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note 3, at 370. States resented the
imposition of additional law enforcement duties without congressional or tribal
funding. Tribes resented state incursion into tribal jurisdictional authority. Id.
97. 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). However, the Indian Civil Rights Act has no pro-
visions for tribal initiation of retrocession proceedings or for tribal veto of a state's
initiation of retrocession proceedings. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note
3, at 371.
98. E.g., Public Law 280 cannot interfere with treaty hunting, fishing, and trap-
ping rights. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1988).
The Supreme Court has also limited Public Law 280's scope. E.g., Bryan v.
Itasca Co., 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (no state property tax on unrestricted Native Ameri-
can property).
99. "Benevolence [or] patronage ... can never lead to self-determination in its
true sense.... Successful negotiations require that each party recognize the right
of all other negotiating parties to participate equally in the negotiating process."
Anderson, supra note 56, at 326 n.240 (quoting Cormick).
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developed trust relationship,100 although occasionally benefiting
Native Americans,' 0 ' illustrates the weakening effects of paternal-
ism. Describing the federal government's duty in the trust rela-
tionship, the Supreme Court characterized Native Americans as
dependent, weak, and helpless.102 The Court's perception of Na-
tive American dependency justified the drastic reductions in the
Native American land base 0 3 and increased jurisdictional control
over Native Americans.1 04 Government paternalism and "trust"
have damaged Native American self-determination.
The Ojibwe need certainty and reliability, not paternalism or
"trust."05 Unreliable, contradictory federal policylO6 has ensnared
tribal, federal, and state governments in an uncooperative and con-
founding legal relationship. The tribal-federal relationship has
been compared to "novelist Mark Harris' card game TEGWAR-
'The Exciting Game Without Any Rules'-except [that] the gov-
ernment always gets to deal."107 Because federal Native American
policy is inconsistent, an agreement similar to Minnesota's 1988
Agreement offers the Ojibwe Bands little security; the 1988 Agree-
ment allows Minnesota a one-year withdrawal option.i 08 Minne-
sota's payment of forbearance compensation and de facto
recognition of some Ojibwe treaty rights' 09 may be merely a brief
historical whim. The Ojibwe can only secure certainty, reliability,
100. The Marshall Court articulated the trust relationship between the United
States and Native American tribes as resembling "a ward to his guardian." Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
101. See Adele Fine, Off-Reservation Enforcement of the Federal-Indian Trust
Responsibility, 7 Pub. L. Rev. 117 (1986) (citing instances of judicial enforcement of
the fiduciary standard on the federal government and arguing for the extension of
the government's fiduciary standard to off-reservation matters).
102. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886). Tribes are "wards of
the nation ... dependent on the United States . .. [due to] their very weakness
and helplessness." Id. See also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903).
(Because of Native American dependency, congressional power to care for and pro-
tect Native Americans could not be limited indirectly by treaty.).
103. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553 (upheld a statute allowing the allocation of tribal
lands, even though allocation was not allowed under a prior treaty).
104. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375 (upheld the Major Crimes Act which granted fed-
eral jurisdiction and federal court venue for seven crimes with Native American or
non-Native American victims).
105. See Baler, supra note 29, at 231-32. "Exploitation and conspiracy, as much
as justice and fellowship, thrive better in an atmosphere of trust." Id.
106. See supra note 3.
107. Frickey, supra note 66, at 1201 (referring to Mark Harris, Bang the Drum
Slowly 8 (1956)).
108. Grand Portage Band of Chippewas of Lake Superior v. Minnesota, Civ. No.
4-85-1090, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. June 8, 1988) (Memorandum and Order). Bands
also have a one-year option, but without treaty rights, withdrawal leaves the Bands
with nothing.
109. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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and self-determination with permanent recognition of their treaty
rights, either through litigation or through Minnesota's affirmative
acceptance of treaty rights.
Part III The Mille Lacs Band Has a Convincing Argument to
Establish Treaty Rights
Although mutual cooperation and reconciliation is recom-
mended, if Minnesota does not recognize treaty rights, the Mille
Lacs Band has a convincing argument for establishing treaty rights
under the 1837 Treaty through litigation. Courts consistently af-
firm treaty rights. Since 1887, Native Americans have been suc-
cessful in all sixteen major cases establishing treaty fishing and
water rights."i 0 Additionally, the Mille Lacs Band's argument is
highly persuasive. In Lac Courte Oreilles v. Voigt,111 the Seventh
Circuit established treaty rights under the same 1837 Treaty at is-
sue here and recently, a Minnesota federal district court in United
States v. Bresette, relying on Voigt, concluded that Minnesota
Ojibwe within the scope of the 1854 and 1842112 Treaties have "full
usufructuary 113 rights." 11 4 Moreover, Minnesota's arguments for
denying treaty rights are diminished by accepted canons of treaty
interpretation.
In Voigt, the Seventh Circuit affirmed treaty rights in Wis-
consin under the 1837, 1842, and 1854 Treaties"i 5 and dismissed the
validity of President Zachary Taylor's 1850 removal order that
Minnesota relies upon;116 the Supreme Court denied certiorari."i7
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court finding that Presi-
110. Herbert McLean, Pact and Impact Ending the Northwest Logging Wars,
Am. Forests, May-June 1987, at 28, 30.
111. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
112. Treaty with the Chippewa, Oct. 4, 1942, 7 Stat. 591.
113. "Usufructuary rights are the right to make a modest living by hunting and
gathering off the land." United States v. Bresette, No. 5-90-7, slip op. at 4 (D. Minn
Apr. 11, 1991) (order).
114. Id. at 7-8.
115. Although only the the 1837 Treaty is at issue in the Mille Lacs Band's claim,
the 1842 and 1854 Treaties are discussed here as well. Voigt interpreted the 1837
Treaty at issue in the Mille Lacs Band's claim when the tribes in Wisconsin brought
suit asserting treaty rights. The 1837 Treaty covers a large area of northwestern
Wisconsin and extends into central Minnesota approximately fifty miles. The 1842
Treaty territory lies north of the 1837 Treaty territory and covers most of northern
Wisconsin bordering Lake Superior. The 1854 Treaty, subject of the 1988 Agree-
ment, covers the northeastern arrowhead region of Minnesota bordering Lake Su-
perior. For a detailed map of the 1837, 1842 and 1854 Treaty territories, see United
States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1362-63 (W.D. Wis. 1978).
116. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 362.
117. Besadny v. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians,
464 U.S. 805 (1983).
Law and Inequality
dent Taylor's removal order exceeded the scope of the 1837 Treaty.
Taylor's removal power was conditioned upon Ojibwe misbehavior;
Taylor's removal order was not a direct response to, nor did the or-
der mention, Ojibwe "misbehavior." 118
Significantly, in Bresette, the court, relying on Voigt, dis-
missed the United States' prosecution of two Ojibwe for the sale of
traditional "dream catchers"119 incorporating migratory bird feath-
ers.' 20 Voigt's interpretation of the 1837, 1842, and 1854 Treaties
with the Chippewa persuaded the Minnesota district court to con-
clude that the 1854 and 1842 Treaties "reserved full usufructuary
rights for the Chippewa."'12 1 Because the Ojibwe defendants were
geographically outside the 1837 Treaty boundaries, the defendants
needed only to rely on the 1854 and 1842 Treaties. However,
Bresette specifically relied upon Voigt's analysis which affirmed
1837 Treaty rights.122 The Seventh Circuit's Voigt interpretation
of the 1837 Treaty and President Taylor's removal order, combined
with the recent Bresette decision, strengthens the Mille Lacs
Band's argument considerably.
Further, Minnesota's claim that the Mille Lacs Band's 1837
Treaty rights were extinguished by the subsequent 1855 Treaty in
Minnesota is weakened by application of treaty interpretation ca-
nons. Although the 1855 Treaty states that the tribes relinquish
"all right, title and interest in" the delineated lands,123 treaty lan-
guage must be construed as the negotiating tribes would have un-
derstood it.32A First, it is implausible that the same Ojibwe chiefs
would relinquish, eighteen years after the 1837 Treaty, rights with-
out which they stated they "could not live."125 In all likelihood,
118. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 362.
119. Dream catchers, traditional objects of artistic and spiritual value, are sus-
pended over sleepers to protect them from dreams during their defenseless sleep.
Dreams and birds have spiritual significance to the Ojibwe. Birds remind the
Ojibwe of the eagle; the eagle bridges the spiritual and material worlds. Bresette,
No. 5-90-7, slip op. at 2.
120. The Migratory Bird Act forbids use or sale of migratory bird feathers. 16
U.S.C. 703 (1988).
121. Bresette, No. 5-90-7, slip op. at 7-8.
122. Id.
123. Treaty with the Chippewa, Feb. 22, 1855, art. I, 10 Stat. 1165. The 1855
Treaty covers a large area of central Minnesota, overlapping the 1837 Treaty
territory.
124. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) (McLean, J., concur-
ring). "The language used in treaties with Indians should never be construed to
their prejudice .... How the words of the treaty were understood by this unlet-
tered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construc-
tion." Id.; see also Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
125. Aish-ke-bo-gi-ko-she (Flat Mouth) stated that the tribes could not live with-
out rights reserved at the 1837 Treaty Conference. See supra note 1 and accompa-
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the Ojibwe did not consider such an integral part of their existence
an ownership interest in property.126 Second, had the United
States intended to eliminate explicitly held treaty rights secured in
the 1837 Treaty, it should have explicitly extinguished the
rights.' 27 In Voigt, the court held that the subsequent 1854 Treaty
did not extinguish the 1837 Treaty rights because "omission of any
reference to those rights in the 1854 [Treaty suggests that the...
band believed their right to use ceded land for traditional pursuits
to be secure and unaffected by the 1854 [T]reaty."' 2 8 Similarly,
Minnesota's claim that the 1855 Treaty extinguished the Mille
Lacs Band's 1837 Treaty rights will fail. The highly detailed,
multi-page 1855 Treaty intricately specifies land holding and com-
pensation schemes but does not specifically mention hunting, fish-
ing, or gathering rights.129 The United States was not interested in
reclaiming hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on ceded land.
Instead, the United States wanted the timber and minerals.130
Third, the land delineated in the 1855 Treaty also covered land
outside the land ceded by the 1837 Treaty, and portions of the
Mille Lacs Band lived outside of the 1855 Treaty area. A respected
Native American ethnohistorian questions the Mille Lacs Band's
affiliation with the Mississippi Bands of the 1855 Treaty.'31 Under
all these circumstances, the 1855 Treaty should not be construed to
extinguish the Mille Lacs Band's treaty rights.
Part IV
A. Cooperation and Reconciliation: A Better Solution
Although the Mille Lacs Band's case is highly persuasive, the
nying text. Flat Mouth signed the 1855 Treaty. Treaty with the Chippewas, Feb.
22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165.
126. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899). A "treaty must... be construed,
not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the
sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians." Id. See also
State v. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714, 723 (Minn. 1980) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (noting that
"western notions of territoriality and exclusivity of property ownership" were for-
eign to tribal communal use of land).
127. Lac Courte Oreilles v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 363 (7th Cir. 1983). See also,
Washington v. Fishing Vessel A'ssn, 443 U.S. 658, 666-67 (1979); Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
128. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 363.
129. Treaty with the Chippewa, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165.
130. See Voigt, 700 F.2d at 344, 345, 347, 348; see also Warren, supra note 17, at
346; Helen E. Knuth, Economic and Historical Background of Northeastern Minne-
sota Lands Ceded by Chippewa Indians of Lake Superior, in Chippewa Indians III
287 (David Agee Horr ed. 1974) (from the Garland American Indian Ethnohistory
Series).
131. Mississippi Chippewa, supra note 19, at 262.
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treaty rights dilemma affords Minnesota and the Ojibwe Bands
holding treaty rights an opportunity to use a cooperative model to
manage the conflict inherent in the treaty rights dilemma and
spread cooperation to other state-tribal interactions. 3 2 A coopera-
tive model assumes the parties desire an equitable agreement and
want to build relationships based on reliability. 33 Litigation does
not supply needed reliability in conflict management and will
thwart needed cooperation.
Practically, litigation results are unpredictable. Moreover, lit-
igation does not guarantee a quick and final resolution to the
treaty rights dilemma or to resource management problems. If the
courts establish treaty rights and force Minnesota to cooperate
with the Ojibwe, Minnesota can continue its opposition, draining
the Ojibwe Bands' resources through appeals and protracted litiga-
tion. If the courts deny treaty rights and force the Ojibwe to coop-
erate with Minnesota, the Ojibwe can continue asserting treaty
rights, exposing themselves to arrest and increasing state enforce-
ment costs. Either result will exacerbate tribal-state tensions.
Most importantly, litigation will harm future cooperation be-
tween Minnesota and the Ojibwe. Although it is asserted that liti-
gation is "cost effective" for establishing rights, 3 4 costs are
measured solely from a short-term economic perspective, without
consideration of long-term social costs.' 3 5 Opportunity costs' 36
must be considered before entering into rights litigation. Because
power contests create new conflicts by "leav[ing] a residue of an-
ger, distrust, and a desire for revenge," 3 7 the lost opportunity for
cooperation is not merely temporary and issue specific, but cooper-
ation can be damaged indefinitely and uncooperative behavior can
cross over to other issues.138 On the other hand, cooperation, once
132. See infra notes 139, 167 and accompanying text.
133. See Donald G. Gifford, A Context Based Theory of Strategy Selection in
Legal Negotiation, 46 Ohio St. L. J. 41, 52 (1985) (Gifford says cooperative relation-
ships are built on trust; here, "reliability" is more accurate for what is proposed.).
134. See Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, supra note 50, at 123.
135. See id. (empirical study unable to measure litigation costs from a social per-
spective); Jeanne M. Brett, Stephen B. Goldberg & William L. Ury, Designing Sys-
tems for Resolving Disputes in Organizations, 45 Am. Psychologist 162, 164-65
(Feb. 1990). The benefits of managing conflict and reconciling interests exceed
minimizing conflict management costs. Furthermore, the higher initial costs of rec-
onciling interests are compensated by the low recurrence of reconciled disputes. Id.
136. In any choice situation, a party must forego some choice. The opportunity
cost is the value of the best available opportunity foregone because of the action.
137. Brett, Goldberg & Ury, supra note 135, at 165.
138. Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Calif.
L. Rev. 2005, 2025 (1987). "Each party must consider the effect of its choice not
only on the immediate conflict but also on later conflict situations." Id.; Louis
Kriesberg, Research and Policy Implications, in Intractable Conflicts and Their
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begun tends to continue.I3 9  There is a temptation among
"[i]ntellectuals and politicians [to be] ideological agitators, cham-
pioning opposition to oppression, or [to be] .. . [working to justify]
the status quo. Less often, they are articulators of reconciliation
.... Yet, those latter roles are, in the long run, critical."140 The
emerging treaty rights dilemma presents Minnesota and the
Ojibwe with an opportunity to reject potentially damaging rights
contests while improving the Minnesota-Ojibwe relationship.141
Minnesota has used negotiated treaty rights agreements to
avoid conflict; Minnesota can now use the agreements as instru-
ments of reconciliation. In 1987, Minnesota observed a "Year of
Reconciliation" to recognize wrongs committed against the Lakota
during the Lakota uprising. 4 2 Minnesota's use of reconciliation
reflects the "deepest and soundest" elements of the ADR move-
ment. 43 Reconciliation recognizes that law and justice are not al-
ways synonymous'44 but that justice is discovered when people
interact and listen to each other.145 The Supreme Court and Con-
gress have unjustly eroded tribal self-determination; the extent of
political justice and self-determination for Native Americans in
Minnesota is manifested in community values revealed in the 1973
and 1988 Minnesota-Ojibwe Agreements. Minnesota's next incre-
ment in justice and reconciliation with Native Americans is the
full, public acceptance of Qjibwe treaty rights without resorting to
a legal rights contest.146
B. The Cooperative Venture
Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from
Transformation 215 (1989). Segments of adversarial groups may "develop vested in-
terests in the struggle. For the fighters, it may become a way of life." Id.
139. Scott, supra note 138, at 2026. By beginning a cooperative response pattern,
mutual cooperation is "introduced and then reinforced by a 'lock-in' effect. Empiri-
cal studies of cooperative interactions indicate that lock-in effects are very strong."
Id. See also Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 21 (1984) (Cooperation,
once begun, can thrive and maintain itself.).
140. Kriesberg, supra note 138, at 220.
141. Minnesota wants to "foster good relationships between Indian[s] and non-
Indian(s]." Memorandum of Agreement at 7, Grand Portage Band of the Chippe-
was of Lake Superior v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-85-1090 (D. Minn. June 8, 1988).
142. State of Minnesota Proclamation, Governor Rudy Perpich (Dec. 19, 1986).
143. Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 Yale
L.J. 1660, 1664-65 (1985).
144. Id. at 1664.
145. Id. at 1665.
146. Acceptance of Ojbiwe treaty rights is merely another step in the journey
out of the treaty rights dilemma. However, if accepting treaty rights is perceived as
a dramatic step, a "fundamental shift .... A basic change in the nature of the con-
flict and the way it is conceived is necessary." Kriesberg, supra note 138, at 217.
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fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our
treatment of Indians ... reflects the rise and fall of our demo-
cratic faith.147
In addition to reconciliation and justice, Minnesota can use
negotiated agreements to manage conflict, rather than merely use
the agreements to avoid conflict. This cooperative venture is pro-
posed as a model to aid in the disposition of treaty rights without
resorting to litigation, to effectively manage the inherent conflict
when two parties share a resource, 4 8 and to serve as a model for
resolution of other tribal-state disputes.
The State of Minnesota should begin the cooperative venture
by accepting Qjibwe treaty rights in ceded land. The individual
Ojibwe Bands holding treaty rights can then choose to either nego-
tiate a treaty rights forbearance agreement from a position of self-
determination or participate with Minnesota in a cooperative ven-
ture to manage resources on ceded land.149 If the Ojibwe Bands
choose to participate in a cooperative venture, they will agree to
use Minnesota Department of Natural Resources technological ex-
pertise in resource management decisions. Like the 1973 and 1988
Minnesota-Ojibwe Agreements, the cooperative venture will inte-
grate Band members into any enforcement schemes. The coopera-
tive venture will be fully publicized as a cooperative undertaking
to mutually manage future conflicts over Minnesota's resources on
ceded land. Representatives of the Minnesota Department of Nat-
ural Resources and the Bands holding treaty rights will meet
monthly with a mutually selected mediator to manage resource
use and implement agreements on ceded land.
Unresolvable issues will be subjected to multi-step considera-
tion.150 If an issue becomes unresolvable in mediated negotiations,
that issue will be the sole issue reconsidered at the next meeting.
If unresolved portions of that issue still remain after that meeting,
each party will submit only those portions of the unresolvable is-
sue in a best offer form to a mutually selected panel of three arbi-
trators for a binding decision. The arbitrators will decide only
147. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note 3, at v.
148. The cooperative venture employs a non-adversarial approach. Cooperative
strategy uses initial concessions to build confidence and reliability and to induce re-
ciprocal cooperative actions. In the cooperative approach, concession is not a sign of
weakness, but is an affirmative technique to begin fair negotiations, and is espe-
cially useful in distributive bargaining, where parties share a fixed resource. See
Gifford, supra note 133, at 46-47.
149. Offering the Ojibwe a choice better effectuates the anti-paternalistic intent
of this cooperative venture.
150. Effective dispute resolution systems need procedures that minimize social
and economic costs in resolving deadlocks. See Brett, Goldberg & Ury, supra note
135, at 167.
[Vol. 9:533
1991] SELF-DETERMINATION AND RECONCILIATION 555
upon the best offers and will not consider the parties' prior resolu-
tion of any other portion of the issue. In short, the purpose of the
arbitration will be a narrow, piece by piece, independent considera-
tion of unresolvable sub-issues. The losing party will pay costs of
the arbitration according to American Arbitration Association
schedules. If the arbitration panel develops an alternative to the
parties' best offers, the parties will have the option of accepting
the alternative and splitting arbitration costs.
This cooperative venture will benefit Minnesota by facilitat-
ing resource management;' 15 by saving litigation and enforcement
costs; and by furthering Minnesota's political prestige resulting
from its innovative resolution of the treaty rights dilemma.152 A
cooperative venture benefits the Ojibwe by recognizing treaty
rights;153 saving litigation and criminal penalties costs; and increas-
ing Ojibwe interactions with Minnesota's resource and information
wealth.154
Accepting treaty rights without judicial coercion is not the
weakening "benevolent" or "paternalistic" behavior 5 5 that is a
continuing and destructive refrain in the Native American rela-
tionship with the dominant culture.156 Accepting treaty rights is
anti-paternalistic; it empowers the Ojibwe in resource manage-
ment or treaty rights settlement negotiations.157 Minnesota's ac-
ceptance of Qjibwe treaty rights will balance Minnesota's influence
over Ojibwe tribal interests in Indian Country with Ojibwe treaty
interests in ceded land. Minnesota can opportunistically use the
treaty rights dilemma to balance the political and negotiating envi-
ronment, thus stimulating a facilitated dialogue to manage conflict
within the cooperative structure.
Dialogue and cooperation are essential because difficult, con-
151. Minnesota wants to "define the manner in which hunting and fishing
[treaty] rights will be exercised, and to insure that the fish and wildlife resource
will be preserved in perpetuity." Memorandum of Agreement at 7, Grand Portage
Band of the Chippewas of Lake Superior v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-85-1090 (D. Minn.
June 8, 1988).
152. The State of Minnesota is proud of the 1988 Agreement which resolved the
1854 Treaty controversy. See Treaty Briefing Paper, supra note 38.
153. The Fond du Lac Band rejected Minnesota's 1.85 million dollar annual offer
rather than forbear recognition and exercise of their treaty rights. Telephone in-
terview with Henry Buffalo, counsel for the Fond du Lac Band (Feb. 13, 1991).
154. See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
156. The Allotment Act, Public Law 280, and the trust relationship are examples
of destructive governmental paternalism toward Native Americans. See supra
notes 3, 95-104 and accompanying text.
157. John Echohawk, Executive Director of the Native American Rights Fund
states, "as Indian's rights are established ... there is a greater likelihood for negoti-
ations ...." Echohawk, supra note 32, at 2 (emphasis added).
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flict-inducing resource management decisions arise after treaty
rights are affirmed. Wisconsin and Qjibwe litigated, recently com-
pleting their thirteenth judicial proceeding in the eight years fol-
lowing the Voigt decision;i58 Minnesota's situation after the
Bresette decision is more unsettled; the Bresette court explicitly
left "the nature and extent of the usufructuary rights open to con-
tention."' 59 Moreover, beyond the obvious treaty interpretation
and resource allocation litigation, unforeseen issues arise, requir-
ing further costly judicial intervention. For example, after treaty
rights had been established and resources allocated, a district court
in the state of Washington held that treaty rights implicitly in-
clude a right to an environmentally protected fishery. 60 Eventu-
ally, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, withdrew the judgement
on procedural grounds,' 6 ' but the prior holdings prompted Native
Americans, the state of Washington, Washington industry, and en-
vironmentalists to negotiate cooperatively as the Timber/Fish/
Wildlife Council (TFWC).162 The TFWC recognized that unantici-
pated problems, compounded by treaty rights in ceded land, re-
quired "formaliz[ing] the reciprocal obligations of the State and
the Tribes toward the fishery resource which they now share."'163
The TFWC cooperative agreement actually eliminated litigation,' 64
relieved racial tensions, and developed a comprehensive resource
management strategy.165 In the TFWC framework, tribes holding
158. See supra note 31.
159. United States v. Bresette, No. 5-90-7, slip op. at 8 (D. Minn. Apr. 11, 1991)
(Order).
160. United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash.
1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, opin-
ion replaced on rehearing en banc, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 994 (1985).
Environmental regulation of Indian Country and, conceivably, environmental
preservation of Native American interests in ceded land poses special jurisdictional
and environmental problems for tribes. For a discussion of environmental regula-
tion issues in Indian Country, see Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett,
Control of the Reservation Environment" Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and
the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 581 (1989); Richard A. Du Bey,
Mervyn T. Tano & Grant D. Parker, Protection of the Reservation Environment
Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 Envtl. L. 449 (1988); Christen-
son, supra note 72; Feldman, supra note 72.
161. United States v. Washington (Phase II), 759 F.2d at 1353.
162. Telephone interview with TFWC spokesperson (Nov. 13, 1990).
163. United States v. Washington (Phase II), 694 F.2d 1374, 1381 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated, opinion replaced, on rehearing en bane, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.) (emphasis
in original).
164. The reduction in litigation in Washington state was astonishing. In 1983,
there were 66 court actions involving the parties. After the plan was negotiated no
more court actions were initiated. Robert C. Barrett, Eperiments in Decisionmak-
ing Processes, Vol. XVII, No. 7 Envtl. L. Rep. 10269, 10270 (1987).
165. The Timber/Fish/Wildlife Final Agreement detailed "the framework, pro-
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treaty rights negotiated from self-determination. Minnesota
should model Washington's cooperative approach.
The cooperative venture accepts the inevitability of future
conflict between Minnesota and the Ojibwe. The cooperative ven-
ture not only considers the resolution of the immediate and future
treaty rights issues but also uses the structured conflict manage-
ment format to maintain and enhance the relationship between
the Ojibwe and Minnesota. The mutually empowered cooperative
venture can refine itself while managing the resource management
conflicts. Later, the venture can be applied to other Minnesota-
Ojibwe conflicts as an evolved model, accomplishing the agree-
ments contemplated by the Tribal State Compact Act.166
C. The Cooperative Venture Will Succeed
Although mutually empowered cooperation in a historically
adversarial relationship seems improbable, "cooperation can get
started even in a world of unconditional defection ..... evolve
from small clusters of individuals .... [and] can protect itself
from invasion by less cooperative strategies. Thus, the gear wheels
of social evolution have a rachet."'1 7 The results of two multidis-
ciplinary, international computer tournaments based on the "Pris-
oner's Dilemma" game' 68  divined several rules to promote
cooperation and maximize benefit yield169 between two parties
cedures and requirements for successfully managing our state's forests so as to
meet the needs of a viable timber industry and at the same time provide protection
for our public resources, fish, wildlife and water as well as the cultural/archeologi-
cal resources of Indian tribes within our own state." Timber/Fish/Wildlife Council,
Final Agreement 1 (1987).
166. One potential issue for further cooperative efforts is a mutual reexamina-
tion of Public Law 280. The Indian Civil Rights Act did not include provisions for
tribal initiation of retrocession, nor did the Act require tribal consent before initiat-
ing retrocession procedures. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note 3, at 371.
167. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 21. See also Scott, supra note 138, at 2026 (the
"lock-in" effect of mutual cooperation has been empirically demonstrated to be
strong).
168. Game theorists developed the "Prisoner's Dilemma" to illustrate why, when
parties are unable to communicate or bargain, they always choose self-interested
behavior, even in situations where cooperation would further advance both parties
individual interests. The Prisoner's Dilemma develops when two accomplices are
arrested for the same crime and questioned separately. If neither confess, they can
only be charged with a minor crime and sentenced to one year. But if one con-
fesses, he is set free in exchange for his cooperation, while his partner, who re-
mained silent, gets five years. If both confess, they each get three years. Although
it is in their collective interest to cooperate, remain silent and receive only a one
year punishment, it is in either party's self-interest to confess. Thus, "[ijndividual
rationality leads to a worse outcome for both .... Hence the dilemma." Axelrod,
supra note 139, at 9.
169. The winning strategy, TIT-FOR-TAT always began by cooperating and de-
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without a central authority forcing parties to cooperate. 170 The
tournaments demonstrated that cooperation is facilitated and mu-
tual benefits are maximized when interactions are future-oriented
and non-finite; 17 1 when interactions are clear and intelligible;172
when the participants are "nice" and not envious of the other's
success; 173 and when participants behave reciprocally.174 This the-
ory of cooperative evolution does not require trust or concern for
another's welfare; cooperation will evolve by rational selection.175
The cooperative rules drawn from prisoner's dilemma tourna-
ments are manifested in the cooperative venture. 76
1. The Cooperative Venture Is Future-Oriented
The specter of non-finite legal conflicts establishing, defining,
and managing the unforeseen conflicts in the Minnesota-Ojibwe
treaty rights dilemma provides the impetus 77 and milieu for coop-
eration between Minnesota and the Ojibwe. In a finite number of
interactions, uncooperative behavior yields the highest payoffs.178
However, a non-finite number of interactions enhances coopera-
tion, 7 9 even in highly adversarial situations. 8 0 The cooperative
venture is future-oriented, relying upon the non-finite nature of
fected only after defection by the other participant. TIT-FOR-TAT forgave imme-
diately, resuming cooperation immediately upon the other participant's cooperation.
Id. at 20. Minnesota's acceptance of treaty rights, followed by Ojibwe acceptance of
continuing Department of Natural Resources expertise models TIT-FOR-TAT.
170. In treaty rights litigation, the court would be the central authority forcing
cooperation. But see supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
171. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 126-32.
172. Id at 120-23.
173. Id at 110-17.
174. Id, at 118-20.
175. I at 6-11.
176. Conflicts managed within a social structure "often take on qualities of a
game." Kreisberg, supra note 138, at 212. See also Axelrod, supra note 139, at 131.
Interactions within a small group deciding policy for and between larger organiza-
tions is like a "multilevel game." Id.
177. See Brett, Goldberg & Ury, supra note 135, at 163. The "costs of poorly
managed conflict ... stimulate[s] organizations to reevaluate the way conflict is be-
ing managed." Id.
178. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 12.
179. Id. at 10. For example, Senators cooperate because they anticipate the other
Senator's future reciprocation. Id at 16. Consider the difficulties a finite-term,
"lame duck" politician has eliciting cooperation. See also Scott, supra note 138, at
2024 (analyzing decisionmaking strategies between parties to long-term contracts,
suggesting a stake in the non-finite future changes negotiating strategy away from
defection).
180. See generally Axelrod, supra note 139, at 57-82. In World War I trench war-
fare, a cooperative live-and-let-live system developed between the Allied and Ger-
man forces. The soldiers nonverbally ceased fire at regular intervals. The truces
were possible because the non-finite, serious interaction made predictability of the
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Minnesota-Ojibwe interaction. Acceptance of the Ojibwe Bands'
treaty rights eliminates the present controversy and focuses on the
future mutual resolution of resource management issues.
The cooperative venture also ensures that Minnesota and the
Ojibwe will continue to perceive the importance of the future by
making interactions more frequent and durable.181 Scheduled
meetings ensure the frequent, continued interaction which makes
the future "loom larger than it otherwise would."182 Moreover,
publicizing the cooperative venture as a cooperative undertaking to
mutually manage future resource conflicts on ceded land publicly
promotes the durability of the relationship. One commentator
uses a wedding to illustrate "a public act designed to celebrate and
promote the durability of the relationship" and notes that
"[d]urability of an interaction can help not only lovers, but ene-
mies."l 8 3 Although Minnesota and the Ojibwe Bands have already
demonstrated they are not enemies by negotiating the 1973 and
1988 Agreements, litigation threatens to upset this relationship.
Minnesota and the Ojibwe can avoid regressing into costly, uncer-
tain litigation and enforcement mechanisms by moving to the next
cooperative increment accepting treaty rights and state expertise.
2. The Cooperative Venture Adds Clarity
The cooperative venture clarifies the status of treaty rights in
Minnesota and adds clarity by limiting the number of participants
in the negotiations. Clarity enhances cooperation and mutual ben-
efit.184 The cooperative venture clarifies the uncertain status of
treaty rights in Minnesota. In the 1988 Agreement, Minnesota,
possibly attempting to maximize individual benefits while attempt-
ing cooperation, clouded the treaty rights issue and created the
current dilemma. Minnesota purchased treaty rights forbearance
enemy's future behavior crucial. Apparently, even the most adversarial relation-
ships can cooperate if the interaction is future-oriented and non-finite.
The live and let live system developed in approximately one-third of all trench
tours by British divisions. Id, at 218 n.1 (citing Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare,
1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System 171-75 (1980)).
181. Frequency and durability of interactions promote cooperation by enlarging
the shadow of the future. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 129.
182. Id
183. Id See also Scott, supra note 138, at 2029 (a precommitment strategy re-
quires parties to behave predictably).
184. The winning strategy in Axelrod's tournaments, TIT FOR TAT, was simple
and clear; the other party could easily understand TIT FOR TAT's actions. Sophis-
ticated strategies to maximize individual benefits frequently became entrenched in
mutual defection merely due to misunderstanding. The uncooperative, strategically
clever (and unsuccessful) players "did not take into account that their own behav-
ior would lead the other player to change." Id. at 120-22 (emphasis in original).
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and then, by agreement, allowed the use of those purchased rights,
while simultaneously denying their validity. In competitive negoti-
ations, obfuscation is strategically beneficial; if your opponent can-
not understand your behavior, your opponent's strategy becomes
less efficient. 8 5 However, Minnesota and the Ojibwe cooperated
in the 1973 and 1988 Agreements and do not need to compete.
Both parties need cooperation for mutual benefit. Unambiguous
recognition of treaty rights will facilitate mutually beneficial
cooperation.
The cooperative venture's structure also adds clarity by en-
suring that decisionmakers meet with only a few others, thereby
helping to initiate and stabilize cooperation.'8 6 Limiting the
number of decisionmakers makes the negotiators recognizable and
their behavior predictable. 8 7 If decisions must be made by state
resource agents in the field, where policy is unclear and parties
conflict without cooperative structure, clarity is diminished and co-
operation is frustrated. On the other hand, the cooperative ven-
ture, by creating a mutual resource management strategy and by
limiting the decisionmakers, enhances clarity and promotes
cooperation.
3. The Cooperative Venture Requires "Niceness" and
Discourages Envy
To reap maximum benefits from the cooperative venture,
Minnesota and the Ojibwe Bands must be "nice." That is, neither
party should attempt to defect by leaving the negotiating table
first. Niceness is a powerful rule; it avoids unnecessary conflict
and is the best predictor of success in maximizing benefits. 86 The
cooperative venture requires niceness on Minnesota's part by its
185. Id. at 123.
186. See id at 131. Referring issues to high level policymakers who are familiar
with each other and the issues, and binding them together in a "long-term ....
multilevel game, [can] promote the emergence of cooperation among groups too
large to interact individually." Id. See also Kriesberg, supra note 138, at 212. Par-
ticipants can hold special roles to manage conflict with other units. When these
participants "have the authority to make binding decisions, shifts toward tractabil-
ity can be relatively quickly done." Id.
187. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 139-40.
188. In the final round of Axelrod's computer tournament, fourteen of the top
fifteen scorers were nice and fourteen of the bottom fifteen scorers were not nice.
Id at 113-14. "Forgiveness," a related concept, forgives defection immediately upon
the other party's resuming cooperation. Because TIT FOR TAT will defect as long
as the other party defects, "a generous level of forgiveness" may be required in
problematic conflicted situations. Id. at 120. See also Scott, supra note 138, at 2028-
30 (suggesting a conciliatory posture of delayed retaliation for defection in order to
stabilize cooperation).
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acceptance of Ojibwe treaty rights and from the Ojibwe by their
acceptance of Minnesota Department of Natural Resources exper-
tise. In the structure of the cooperative venture, Minnesota and
the Ojibwe will avoid unnecessary conflict and utilize the niceness
rule to maximize future benefits.
Minnesota need not envy the Ojibwe Band's gain of treaty
rights; Minnesota's initial cooperative gesture (niceness) will have
a "lock-in" effect and promote the cooperation necessary for Min-
nesota's benefits to accrue.'8 9 If cooperation is to begin and stabi-
lize, participants cannot be envious of each other's gains.190 Most
negotiation strategy assumes a competitive posture even though
cooperation predominates in everyday life. For example, business
people cooperatively trade concessions and favors without envy to
enhance long-term mutual benefit. A participant measures success
by the other participant's lack of success only if the goal is to harm
that other participant.191 In its prior agreements, Minnesota and
the Qjibwe have demonstrated a desire to cooperate, not harm
each other. If the cooperative venture is to succeed, Minnesota
and the Ojibwe Bands must return to cooperation without envy.
In doing so, they can avoid the destructive conflict of threatened
litigation and ensure mutual benefits.
4. The Cooperative Venture Encourages Reciprocity:
An Analogy
After cooperation is established by an enlarged future, reci-
procity will maintain the cooperative venture's stability and pro-
mote cooperation. Cooperation is enhanced by reciprocity between
participants.192 Cooperation is promoted when participants ex-
change "reciprocal concrete incentives" necessary for each to com-
plete their task.193
A study involving chronic patients illustrates the power of re-
ciprocal concrete incentives with the evolution of "informed con-
sent."194 Legislatures, to empower patients and encourage patient
self-determination in treatment decisions, created a duty for doc-
tors to inform patients. Doctors resisted, perceiving patients as
189. Scott, supra note 138, at 2026; see also Axelrod, supra note 139, at 21.
190. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 110.
191. Id. at ill.
192. Id at 118 (Reciprocity is "amazingly robust," it defeats uncooperative strate-
gies and flourishes in interactions with other cooperative strategies.).
193. Handler, supra note 56, at 1008.
194. See id at 1002-8.
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child-like.195 Doctors complied minimally with legal requirements
to reduce their risk exposure and patients acquiesced to their doc-
tors' recommendations. However, with the chronic patient, doctors
needed high levels of patient cooperation and patient information
to provide competent care. Patients were given discretionary
power regarding their care. The shared decisionmaking stimulated
information-sharing dialogue and developed understanding and co-
operation over an extended period.196
The analogy is clear. Minnesota and the Ojibwe Bands face a
chronic treaty rights and game management relationship. Like the
doctor and the patient relationship, much can be mutually gained
by cooperation, reciprocity, and understanding over this indefinite,
extended period. The Ojibwe Bands, like the patient,197 will bene-
fit from Minnesota's sophisticated resource management research
and wealth. Like the information-wealthy doctor, Minnesota
needs tribal cooperation, resource management information, and
prestige. Acceptance of treaty rights allows the Ojibwe Bands, like
the patient, discretion and input in a critical area of life. That dis-
cretion will decrease political tensions, increase Minnesota's pres-
tige as a problem solver, and increase resource management
information.198 Like the physician, Minnesota's acceptance of the
Ojibwe Bands' treaty rights surpasses minimal compliance and ex-
changes real reciprocal concrete incentives with the Ojibwe Bands.
Minnesota's acceptance of treaty rights and sharing game manage-
ment discretion and the Ojibwe Bands' agreement to work with
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources are reciprocal con-
crete incentives. In addition to the mutual benefits, the Ojibwe-
Minnesota cooperative venture will allow the Ojibwe and Minne-
sota to demonstrate mutual reliability.
Part V
A Expect Minnesota and the Ojibwe to Respect the
Resources
Both Minnesota and the Ojibwe will act reliably to protect
195. Id. at 1003. The powerless are perceived as child-like. See supra notes 100-
102 and accompanying text; see infra text accompanying note 201.
196. Id. at 1008; see also Brett, Goldberg & Ury, supra note 135, at 165. 'The in-
formation shared in the process of searching for a resolution may increase mutual
understanding and benefit the relationship." rd.
197. Analogizing the Ojibwe to the patient and Minnesota to the doctor is not
meant to suggest that the Ojibwe are not able to care for themselves or that Minne-
sota is insensitive.
198. To solicit information, including self-reporting, regulators should be cooper-
ative advice-givers. Handler, supra note 56, at 1026.
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the resources since exploitation of the resources would not be in
the best interest of either party. Holding resources as common
goods is "[t]he best reason for confidence in another's good care of
what one cares about .... [Although] [t]his may not, and usually
will not, ensure agreement on what best should be done to take
care of that good .... it rules out suspicion of ill will."'99 Upon
accepting Ojibwe treaty rights, resources on the ceded land become
the common goods of both Minnesota citizens and the Ojibwe
Bands. Minnesota and the Ojibwe may disagree on the best re-
source management techniques to employ on ceded land, but rec-
ognizing the resource as common goods removes the ill will that
results in litigation, increased social tensions, noncompliance with
conservation schemes, information loss, and disruption of coopera-
tion. Expectations of both parties to respect the resources within
the cooperative venture allows Minnesota and the Ojibwe to meet
each others' mutual expectations, creating a record of stability and
reliability to counter vacillating federal policy.2oo The Ojibwe par-
ticipation in setting and meeting resource use expectations will
also counter the paternalistic, racist characterization of Native
Americans as child-like and irresponsible.201
B. The Cooperative Venture Can Reduce Racism and
Political Unrest
The cooperative venture will reduce racism and status hierar-
chy. In discussing the social structure of cooperation, one com-
mentator says that "labelling" participants chills cooperation.20 2 A
label is a fixed, observable characteristic. Cooperation is dimin-
ished by labelling because labels influence the choice of whether
or not to cooperate-or even interact--and can have the "dis-
turbing consequence of . . . lead[ing] to self-confirming stereo-
types." 20 3 Labelling also limits minorities' interactions with the
resource-wealthy majority, thereby supporting the status hierar-
chy.204 Although both Minnesota and the Ojibwe Bands suffer by
not interacting cooperatively, the Ojibwe Bands suffer greater
losses from the limitation on interactions with resource-wealthy
199. Baler, supra note 29, at 243.
200. The potential stability created by meeting mutually determined expecta-
tions should be contrasted with the effects of the vacillation in governmental policy
unilaterally formulated by the dominant culture. See supra note 3.
201. See supra notes 100-102, 195 and accompanying text.
202. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 147.
203. Id; see Kriesberg, supra note 138, at 215 (Adversaries try to "define the
other and impose an identification.").
204. See Axelrod, supra note 139, at 148-49.
Law and Inequality
Minnesota.205 The cooperative venture's scheduled monthly medi-
ated meetings and use of Minnesota Department of Natural Re-
sources expertise will increase the number of Ojibwe interactions
with Minnesota and will provide a venue for both to view each
other as cooperative and reliable. Increasing the quantity and
quality of interactions between Minnesota and the Ojibwe will di-
minish the impact of labelling and disrupt the status hierarchy
dominating the Ojibwe. As quality interactions increase, the bene-
fits from the mutual cooperation accrue. As mutual cooperation
and benefits increase, the status hierarchy can change and the
Minnesota-Ojibwe relationship will evolve constructively and
positively.2o
The political problem of potential violence between Ojibwe
Bands exercising treaty rights and state citizens shadows the ac-
ceptance of Ojibwe treaty rights.20 7 The furor over the exercise of
the 1837 Treaty rights in Wisconsin dwarfs the actual impact of the
Ojibwe Bands' resource use.208 Minnesota is justifiably concerned
about political unrest, but the prospect of political unrest should
not dictate justice. Certain social issues need to be resolved to
bring "recalcitrant reality" into alignment with our ideals.209 In
the South, courts forced the states to bring recalcitrant reality into
line with our constitutional and democratic ideals. Likewise, in
Wisconsin, the courts forced Wisconsin to accept the 1837 Treaty
rights. In the South and in Wisconsin, the state governments re-
sisted and did not support the judicially established rights. The
lack of state support created ambiguity that exacerbated a difficult
situation. In both cases, controversy, racism, harassment, and vio-
lence followed.
Minnesota has an opportunity to act affirmatively by clearly
supporting the Ojibwe Bands' treaty rights. By acting affirma-
tively within the cooperative venture, Minnesota can "avoid... ra-
cial enmities," 210 circumvent costly, divisive litigation, and
effectively manage future resource conflicts on ceded land. Most
importantly, Minnesota and the Ojibwe can refine a cooperative
205. Id at 147.
206. The cooperative exchanges in World War I trench warfare actually changed
the nature of the interaction. The cooperative exchanges "tended to make the two
sides care about each other." I& at 85; see also Brett, Goldberg & Ury, supra note
135, at 165 (sharing information in resolving disputes may increase understanding
and benefit the relationship).
207. Minnesota negotiated the 1988 Agreement to avert potential violence.
Treaty Briefing paper, supra note 38.
208. See supra note 29.
209. Fiss, supra note 55, at 1089.
210. Treaty Briefing Paper, supra note 38.
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model for managing future state-tribal conflicts. Minnesota's 1973
and 1988 cooperative efforts with the Ojibwe Bands should be ex-
tended by publicly accepting and supporting Ojibwe treaty rights.
In so doing, Minnesota and the Ojibwe Bands can demonstrate the
heartening proposition that the "gears of social evolution have a
rachet."211
211. Axelrod, supra note 139, at 21.

